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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

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Attention Mrs. Tromb
Keep this study toge

DATE: October 3, 19
New York

PART I OF II

(21) **SUBJECT: Portuguese Guinea**

PARTICIPANTS: PORTUGAL

H.E. Rui Manuel Patricio, Foreign Minister
Amb. Joao Hall Themido
Mr. Luis Navega, Foreign Minister's Chef de Cabinet

U.S.

Under Secretary William J. Porter
Robert E. Barbour, Special Assistant

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The Foreign Minister launched into the topic that was obviously uppermost in his mind: the PAIGC's "so-called proclamation of independence". The PAIGC was a terrorist movement. Being less and less successful in its efforts to win over the people and faced by the tremendous efforts being made by the Portuguese Government in economic development, the PAIGC was simply turning to a new political campaign. Minister Patricio said the present Governor of Guinea, the dynamic General Spinoia, was about to be replaced by a General with extensive experience in Angola. During the past five years Gen. Spinoia had won over the enormous majority of the people through his community development programs, etc. Because the PAIGC knew it was losing the political fight, it was now simply trying a new attention-getting tactic. Its claims to control three-fourths of the territory were a complete lie, and the UN had

(7) P:RBarbour:rms
(Drafting Office and Officer)

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been invited to send a mission there to ascertain the realities of the situation. Even so, there were many UN members who would heed the PAIGC's call for recognition and support its claim that the Portuguese were invaders in this West African province.

The Foreign Minister said he was fully aware of the American position on self-determination. Yet, it would be terrible if this fictional independence gained support. Next there would be similar appeals from an equally fictitious government in Chile. The situation in Portuguese Guinea was well in hand, and will remain that way in the absence of massive Soviet support or outside intervention. The Soviet interest lay not in Guinea itself but in the Cape Verde Islands and their strategic relationship to South Atlantic oil movements. Obviously, it was not in the United States' interest to have a pro-Soviet government in Portuguese Guinea. This would simply be the beginning of other such developments in West Africa; Senegal would be next. In Guinea, Portugal was facing a situation that was purely and simply military aggression. It was not a question of self-determination, and he therefore looked to the U.S. for support, especially in the Security Council. Could he count on it?

Ambassador Porter said we had no intention of being stamped by an announcement of some group here or there that it had established a "government". To such matters the United States always applied certain basic criteria; certain requirements had to be met before the claim could be treated seriously. A fundamental one was whether the group actually exercised authority over the population and territory it claimed to represent. He could not dispute the Foreign Minister's statement that the situation in Guinea was under control, and his own experiences in Viet Nam and Paris with the PRG's spurious claims amply demonstrated that such claims had to be carefully scrutinized.

Ambassador Porter said it was obvious that the PAIGC was trying to arouse a United Nations interest among those groups whose aims and ambitions were not those of the West. However, he did not have the impression that the PAIGC was generating as much support as it had hoped it would. Therefore, we shall watch the situation within the perspective of our traditional criteria. At present it was clear that they were not met. From what the Foreign Minister said, they were not likely to be. He therefore did not think PAIGC action would cause problems in US-Portuguese relations. Portugal could count on fairly

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general Western support in the UNGA and in the Security Council. As of now, he did not see massive support for the PAIGC in the UN, at least not this year.

Ambassador Themido said the Ambassador's views supported what he had been telling Lisbon, that is, that the United States would not respond to the PAIGC's appeal. But would the United States make this position public? Would we say we were against it? If we would tell our African friends, some of them would be discouraged from helping to widen the Guinea controversy.

Ambassador Porter said we understood Portugal's concerns and we would be in touch as the situation developed. He doubted that people were unaware of the position the United States took in such situations. We had not yet determined what to say about the PAIGC because we did not yet see emerging the sort of situation described by the Foreign Minister, whose concerns would certainly be brought to the attention of the American Government. Minister Patricio said Portugal would never agree to deal with a liberation movement. This was a matter of principle--because such movements did not amount to self-determination and, pragmatically, because to treat with them would build up their stature. Portugal had many recent and positive accomplishments in Africa--in political and economic development, in a new constitution, in broader participation of the peoples, etc. This was self-determination. Moreover, Portugal welcomed direct negotiations with African governments, though not if they included representatives of the liberation movements. Toward Portugal's African neighbors it adopted a moderate policy. This was especially true of Zambia which was permitted to continue to use the railroad, the best example of Portuguese good will that the Foreign Minister could think of. He was concerned at Zaire's role in the reconciliation of the MPLA and the GRAE. Despite this, and despite Mobutu's following the local trend, they were all in all glad that he was in power in Zaire. Kaunda was a more complicated problem. With Nyerere there was nothing that could be done, and he did not need to comment on Sekou Toure.

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